Abstract-In order to guard forward contracts from the locational marginal price (LMP) volatility, financial transmission rights (FTRs) are issued in the centralized power markets. However, the current FTR system can provide hedge only against the congestion components of LMP differentials. Consequently, the loss components remain unhedged. To bridge the gap, a framework is developed in this paper to implement an FTR system that will provide hedge against the loss prices. The availability of loss-hedging FTRs in addition to the congestion hedging FTRs further reduces the exposure of the forward market participants to the LMP volatility. The loss-hedging framework developed is carefully designed to fit the practical environment. All the primary issues for the implementation of loss-hedging FTRs, such as the revenue adequacy test, auction, and auction revenue rights, are carefully addressed. Revenue adequacy of loss-hedging FTRs can be ensured by means of a test called as the offset capacity test. Some efficient policies are also designed for the successful functioning of loss-hedging FTRs. At the end of the paper, a case study is carried out to assess the effectiveness of the methodology developed.
NOMENCLATURE
Price of an LOFTR of the th type.
Slack weight vector.
Loss coefficient factor for the path of the th obligation LOFTR.
Loss coefficient factor for the path of the th option LOFTR.
Number of all possible active-inactive combinations of option LOFTRs.
Total number of offers (from generators) and bids (from loads and transactions) submitted in the day-ahead energy market. Energy component of .
Loss component of .
Number of rows in .
Total number of LOFTR bids.
Total number of network capacity constraints.
Bid price related to the th LOFTR bid.
Column vector containing the MW amounts of the base option LOFTRs.
Column vector containing the MW amounts of the base obligation LOFTRs.
constant matrix containing the loading factors of the requested (through bids) LOFTRs in the offset capacity constraint. Column vector containing all the offer and bid variables in the day-ahead energy market.
Variable term representing the total network loss.
Upper limit on .
Column vector containing the net nodal injections caused by the physical equivalents of the LOARRs.
Parameter vector (column) representing the net nodal inelastic loads in the day-ahead energy market.
Column vector containing the net nodal injections caused by the physical equivalents of active LOFTRs.
constant matrix that converts nodal injections into line flows.
Variable vector (column) signifying the awarded amounts towards all the LOFTR bids.
Variable vector (column) signifying the awarded amounts towards the obligation LOFTR bids.
Variable vector (column) signifying the awarded amounts towards the option LOFTR bids. Objective function of an LOFTR auction problem.
Optimal value of as the function of .
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE price risk for the bilateral contracts owing to the volatility of locational marginal prices (LMPs) can be efficiently hedged by means of financial transmission rights (FTRs) [1] - [6] . Similarly to the physical transmission right, the financial transmission right also defines a property right on the transmission network. An FTR, in effect, gives its owner some financial support to pay the network usage price that he is charged in the day-ahead energy market for his transaction. The basic parameters of an FTR are a source, a sink, a MW amount, and the time of validity. At a certain hour, an FTR may remain active or may become inactive depending upon its category [6] . When an FTR is active (i.e., when the FTR is used), its value is given by the product of its MW amount and the price term against which the hedge is provided. The value of an inactive (i.e., not used) FTR automatically becomes zero even though the above price term is nonzero. Among the two available versions of FTRs, an obligation FTR always remains active. However, an option FTR takes the active status only when the value of the respective price term is nonnegative. The FTR owners are paid according to the hourly values of their FTRs.
In the case a lossless network model [7] is employed in dispatch scheduling, the price term that is used to calculate the hourly value of an FTR is the difference between its sink and source LMPs. Consequently, the price risk due to the LMP volatility can be completely hedged by means of FTRs. However, many of the power markets are now adopting the practice of marginal loss pricing. With the inclusion of the network loss in the LMP calculation, it becomes necessary to decompose the LMP into energy, loss and congestion components for the settlement of FTRs [8] . The energy component has a unique value throughout the system, whereas the values of the loss and congestion components may vary from one location to another location. The congestion component of the LMP differential on a path is given by the difference between the congestion components of the respective sink and source locational marginal prices. Note that, in the FTR context, a path is defined simply by a source-sink pair rather than an alternating series of nodes and lines. Similarly, the difference between the loss components of the sink and source LMPs determines the loss component of the LMP differential. In the current system, FTRs are valued only according to the congestion components of LMP differentials. Consequently, the loss components remain unhedged. It should be noted that the energy component of an LMP differential is always zero. This is because the energy component of the LMP at a certain location is always the same as that at any other location.
Two different proposals to hedge the loss price risk can be found in the literature [9] , [10] . According to [9] , it is not necessary to decompose LMPs into the different components; instead, the FTRs can be valued by using the whole locational marginal prices. It is also essential to issue locational or unbalanced FTRs [2] for ensuring revenue adequacy. Unlike a regular FTR that is point-to-point (PtP), a locational FTR is defined for either a point of injection (injection-type) or a point of withdrawal (withdrawal-type). For a withdrawal-type FTR, its per-MW value is given by the LMP at the corresponding location. In the case the FTR is of injection-type, its per-MW value is equal to the negated LMP at its location. The bid price for an injection-type locational FTR should be nonpositive, whereas it should be nonnegative for a withdrawal-type locational FTR. Such an FTR, in effect, allows an individual load or generator to freeze its buy or sale price, respectively, in advance for a certain MW quantity. Therefore, market players may show interest in such FTRs. However, the basis of the loss hedging theory of [9] is a revenue adequacy test mechanism [2] that itself is not well justified with regard to its applicability to the practical system condition. The primary limitations of the above revenue adequacy test mechanism are discussed in [6] and [11] . In [12] , a counterexample is presented showing how the particular revenue adequacy test may, in reality, end up with revenue shortfall in a practical environment.
A different kind of transmission rights was proposed in [10] to provide hedge against the loss price volatility. The congestion price risk is still hedged by means of classical FTRs. However, the primary assumption underlying the particular concept is that the superposition principle holds well for the network loss. This is not true in reality owing to the presence of an offset term in the loss expression. It is also assumed that the average values of the loss and energy components of an LMP for a future time period with a reasonable span can be accurately estimated. If it is true, there will be, in fact, no question of loss risk hedging. The most critical assumption of [10] is that the physical equivalents of the loss-hedging rights exactly match the day-ahead dispatch schedules in aggregate. This is again an invalid assumption as some of the market players may prefer not to buy hedges against the network loss. Due to all the above reasons, the methodology, also, seems not to be practically implementable. Note that the physical equivalent of a transmission right is defined as a nodal injection and withdrawal pattern consistent with the source, sink and MW specifications of the respective transmission right. For example, the physical equivalent of a point-to-point FTR is a power transaction between the respective source and sink locations. The MW amount of this power transaction is the same as that of the corresponding FTR. Similarly, the physical equivalent of an injection-type locational FTR is a power injection of the same MW at the respective location.
It is not essential that there should be some instruments that can guard market players from the volatility of the loss components of locational marginal prices. This is because the network loss usually do not have a significant influence in creating the price difference between two location. Yet, it is always better to provide hedge against the whole LMP differential rather than against the congestion component only. Keeping in view the fact, a robust and practically implementable methodology is developed in this paper for providing price guard against the loss price risk. Unlike the FTR concept of [9] , it is still required to make the LMP decomposition to implement the methodology proposed. In fact, there can be FTRs that are settled according to the loss components of LMP differentials. These FTRs are structurally similar to the conventional FTRs, and not like the loss hedging rights proposed in [10] . A mechanism called as the offset capacity test (OCT) is developed to ensure the revenue adequacy of loss-hedging FTRs. The process of issuing losshedging FTRs is discussed and exemplified through a numerical example. A general managerial framework for the overall FTR issuance is suggested to make a proper utilization of losshedging FTRs. In addition, an efficient policy is designed to enhance the availability of loss-hedging FTRs. Thus, all the fundamental implementation issues of loss-hedging FTRs are covered. The effectiveness of the loss-hedging framework proposed is depicted through a case study.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The dc optimal power flow (DCOPF) model of the marginal loss pricing is briefly described in Section II. The basic framework for the implementation of loss-hedging financial transmission rights is discussed in Section III. A numerical example for illustrating the formulation of the offset capacity constraint is presented in Section IV. The managerial framework suggested to release FTRs is described in Section V. A locational FTR concept is developed in Section VI to enhance the availability of loss-hedging FTRs. The case study is presented in Section VII. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section VIII.
II. DCOPF MODEL OF MARGINAL LOSS PRICING
In most of the power markets, line flows are modeled through the dc power flow approximation in the dispatch scheduling problem. It is by definition that the dc power flow model itself is lossless. Therefore, it is not possible to represent the system loss at the line-level. In other words, the flow over a line as seen from the sending end cannot be different from that as seen from the receiving end. Consequently, the system loss is to be represented at the node-level. This is done by distributing the total network loss as additional loads over the system nodes by means of a loss distribution vector [13] . In order to maintain the convexity of the optimization problem, the network loss is approximately expressed as a linear function (by means of the nodal loss coefficient vector ) of nodal injections. The day-ahead dispatch problem is formulated as follows:
The above model is in practice in the New England and PJM. Constraint (2) is the network capacity constraint considering both the base and contingent network topologies. The matrix converts nodal injections into line flows both for the forward and reverse directions assigned to the lines. The vector is converted into nodal injections by means of the conversion matrix . The elements of are the line loading limits. Constraint (3) is the power balance constraint. The approximated linear relationship between the network loss and nodal injections is enforced in (4). The scalar is the offset term in the linear loss expression, and the other constraints are self-explanatory. Thus, the Lagrangian function of this optimization problem can be written as (7) where , and are the vectors of Lagrangian multipliers. The LMP at a node is defined as the rate of decrease of the optimal social welfare with respect to the increase of the fixed (or inelastic) load at that node. Therefore, from the theory of sensitivity analysis of the convex optimization problem [14] (8)
According to the KKT necessary conditions of optimality [14] , [15] (9) Therefore (10)
The energy, loss, and congestion components ( , and , respectively) of LMPs can be obtained as follows: (11) (12) (13) Thus, each pool participant has to pay (load) or is paid (generator) the LMP at its location. For a bilateral transaction, the market player has to pay a network usage charge to the independent system operator (ISO). The network usage price charged to a bilateral transaction is given by the rate of decrease of the optimal social welfare with respect to the increase of the price-insensitive transaction amount on the corresponding path. Therefore, the price is equal to the sink LMP minus the source LMP. The network usage charge imposed upon a bilateral transaction is further divided into a congestion charge and a loss charge according to the congestion and loss components of the LMP difference. The net congestion collection (NCC) of the ISO is given by the sum of the congestion payments made by the bilateral contracts, plus the sum of the congestion payments made by the loads, minus the sum of the congestion payments made to the generators, i.e., (14) By applying the complementary slackness condition of the KKT rule [14] , [15] for (2), the expression of NCC can be finally written as (15) Similarly, the net loss collection (NLC) of the ISO can be calculated as (16) As and , the net congestion collection is always nonnegative. Although the nonnegativity of the NLC cannot be guaranteed mathematically, it hardly becomes negative as both and usually bear the same sign. For the usual choice of (i.e., slack weight vector), when all the elements of are nonnegative, both and are mostly negative. There may also be certain for which is positive. For such a choice of the energy reference, the usually displays a positive value.
It should be noted that the dispatch problem (1)- (6) always produces an energy reference (or slack) independent solution [13] . This implies that the dispatch solution, the locational marginal prices and the congestion components of locational marginal prices do not exhibit any dependency on the energy reference. Consequently, the net congestion collection and the net loss collection are also independent of the choice of the energy reference. The loss component of an LMP difference term is also an energy reference independent quantity.
III. BASIC FRAMEWORK FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LOSS-HEDGING FTRS
As mentioned earlier, there can be two parallel FTR systems in the market. One of the systems will provide hedge against the network congestion, whereas the other will provide hedge against the network loss. The FTRs that provide hedge against the network congestion are called as congestion-only FTRs (COFTRs), and the FTRs that provide hedge against the network loss are called as loss-only FTRs (LOFTRs). The price term that is used in the evaluation of an LOFTR is the loss component of the LMP differential. The COFTRs are the same as the traditional FTRs. Similarly to a COFTR, the value of an LOFTR is also slack-independent for the above dispatch model.
A. Revenue Adequacy
Revenue adequacy is an important consideration in the issuance of financial transmission rights. For congestion-only FTRs, there should be enough collection from the network congestion for paying full FTR credits. Similarly, for loss-only FTRs, the loss collection should be sufficient to pay full FTR credits. The revenue adequacy of COFTRs can be ensured by means of a well known mechanism called as the simultaneous feasibility test (SFT) [1] , [2] , [5] , [6] , [11] , [16] . Similarly, a procedure, called as the offset capacity test (OCT), can be employed for the revenue adequate issuance of LOFTRs. The offset capacity test can be stated as follows: If the network loss induced by the physical equivalents of active LOFTRs is less than or equal to when is negative and greater than or equal to when is positive, the net loss collection (day-ahead) at the corresponding hour would usually be at least equal to the total LOFTR target payment at this hour. Ideally, the network loss model to be used in the OCT should be the same as that used for power scheduling. The statement of the OCT is proven below.
The total target payment (TTP) towards loss-only FTRs can be calculated as (17) Total target payment means the total payment that should be ideally made to the FTR owners. Now, let the network loss induced by the physical equivalents of active LOFTRs be no higher than for being negative (18) As mentioned earlier, is usually negative for the negative
Next, consider the case that the is positive and the network loss induced by the physical equivalents of active LOFTRs be no lower than as follows:
As is usually positive for the positive
Note that the proof of the OCT theorem is based on the assumption that the sign of cannot be different from that of . This is not an impractical assumption although it cannot be proven analytically. It is, in fact, a well observed phenomenon that for the practical market condition, where all the generators and loads submit positive offer and bid prices, the occurrence of a sign difference between and is very rare. It has also been implicitly assumed in the proof presented above that the same energy reference is used in the dispatch problem and in the OCT to calculate the loss factors and the loss offset. However, this is not compulsory. The energy reference considered in the OCT can be different from that considered in the dispatch problem. This is because of the energy reference independency of the dispatch model employed. Moreover, the offset capacity test of LOFTRs itself does not exhibit any reference dependency. The energy reference can be arbitrarily chosen in the OCT, and for any choice of the energy reference, the result will essentially remain the same. To prove the energy reference independency of the OCT, consider two different slack weight vectors and . The value of a reference dependent parameter corresponding to a particular slack weight vector is indicated by the corresponding weight vector in the superscript. Now, the following relationship between and holds well [13] : (22) where Similarly, the following relationship between and holds well:
(23) Let be negative. Now
Note that . Thus
The relationship (25) can be alternatively written as (26) Clearly, even if the energy reference is changed from to , the will still pass the OCT. The same is also true when is positive.
B. Auction Formulation
COFTRs and LOFTRs are to be issued separately. In general, auction and allocation are two alternative mechanisms for issuing FTRs. Without losing generality, we will restrict our discussion only to formulation of the auction problem. The objective function of an FTR auction problem is the negated quotebased sum of the issued amounts towards the FTR bids (which is similar to the negated social welfare function in the energy market), and this function should be minimized. The cleared amount towards each bid must lie within its lower (which is zero) and upper (which is the requested amount) limits. In order to ensure revenue adequacy, the simultaneous feasibility condition (which is basically the application of the SFT considering both the obligation and the option) [6] , [11] must be satisfied while issuing congestion-only FTRs. In the case of loss-only FTRs, these FTRs must satisfy the offset capacity condition, which can be stated as follows:
For any active-inactive combination of LOFTRs (both base and requested), the network loss induced by the physical equivalents of active LOFTRs must not be higher or lower than the negated value of the offset term of the linear loss expression if the offset value is negative and positive, respectively.
For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed here that all the LOFTRs are issued for a same set of hours. The explanation of base FTRs is given in [6] and [11] . Thus, the offset capacity constraints (OCCs) can be initially written as (27) where For the th active-inactive combination of loss-only option FTRs By means of directional breaking [17] , the constraint set (27) can be finally reduced to only a single constraint as follows: (28) where . The existence of is guaranteed as LOFTRs are fundamentally similar to the classical FTRs.
C. Auction Pricing
Financial transmission rights are priced following the same marginal pricing rule as for the energy pricing [16] . The auction optimization problem for loss-only FTRs can be compactly formulated as
Here, the vector contains all the requested obligation and option LOFTR terms. Constraint (30) is the offset capacity constraint. and contain the loading factors of requested and base LOFTR terms, respectively, in the offset capacity constraint. The offset capacity that is offered in this auction is given by . It is important to understand the difference between the and the . The vector contains those LOFTRs that have been already issued in the previous auctions and allocations. For example, the LOFTRs that are issued in an annual auction will be the pre-existing LOFTRs in the subsequent monthly auctions. The base LOFTR vector is obtained by adding the self-scheduled LOFTR amounts to and subtracting the surrendered LOFTR amounts from the vector. The definitions of self-scheduling and surrender can be obtained in [6] and [11] . Now, the Lagrangian function of the above optimization problem can be written as
The price of a loss-only FTR similar to can be calculated as (34)
In general, two LOFTRs are said to be similar (or of same type) if they have the same loading factor (i.e., coefficient factor) in the offset capacity constraint. Therefore, according to (34), the price of an LOFTR is given by the product of its loading factor and shadow price of the OCC. The auction participant pays or is paid this price depending upon whether this FTR is issued or bought back, respectively, by the ISO. The net auction collection (NAC) of the ISO can be calculated as (35) From the complementary slackness condition, the expression of NAC can be reduced to (36) Clearly, if the offset capacity offered in the auction is nonnegative, the value of the net auction collection will also be nonnegative.
D. Auction Revenue Rights
Auction revenue right (ARR) is a mechanism through which the proceeds from an FTR auction are distributed among the firm transmission customers. For example, in the PJM [16] , the ARR mechanism is used to distribute the annual auction collections among the firm point-to-point and network service customers. Each ARR is defined between a certain source-sink pair and for a certain MW amount. The ARR mechanism is basically an indirect method for the allocation of FTRs. Similarly to FTRs, it is also required to categorize ARRs into congestion-only ARRs (COARRs) and loss-only ARRs (LOARRs). The value of an ARR is given by the product of its MW amount and the obligation FTR price on its path in the corresponding auction. By definition, each ARR is an obligation, i.e., an ARR may incur a negative value. The COARRs are similar to the classical ARRs, and should be used to distribute the collections from a COFTR auction. The collections from an LOFTR auction should be distributed by means of LOARRs. The total target payment towards the loss-only ARRs can be calculated as follows:
In order to ensure revenue adequate auction collection, the offset capacity test must be carried out while issuing LOARRs. The network loss or the negated value of the network loss induced by the physical equivalents of the issued LOARRs should then be no greater than the offset capacity offered in the corresponding auction if is negative and positive, respectively. The feasibility of LOARRs can be mathematically stated as (38) The OCT theorem for LOARRs can be proven in the same way as it has been carried out for LOFTRs. As for the LOFTRs, the energy reference independency of the OCT also holds for the LOARRs. However, the vector to be used in (37) should strictly have the same slack basis as taken in the corresponding FTR auction.
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
In this section, we will numerically illustrate the formulation of the offset capacity constraint. Consider a simple four-bus and five-line system. The and (in MW) for this system (with respect to a certain base case state and a certain energy reference) are calculated as and , respectively. The path and category descriptions of the LOFTR bids are shown in Table I . There are a pre-existing obligation LOFTR of 20 MW on Path 1-2 and a pre-existing option LOFTR of 10 MW on Path 4-2. The owner of the pre-existing option LOFTR self-schedules another 5 MW option on the same path, whereas 10 MW of the pre-existing obligation LOFTR is surrendered.
The vector is given by . The elements of and can be calculated as follows:
As is negative, and . Finally, the values of , , , and can be calculated as
V. OVERALL MANAGERIAL FRAMEWORK OF THE FTR AUCTION
It is important to appropriately sequence the issuances of COFTRs and LOFTRs to provide the best possible risk-hedging benefit to the market players. There are three alternatives:
• Alternative 1: Simultaneous issuance of COFTRs and LOFTRs; • Alternative 2: To issue LOFTRs first, and COFTRs next; • Alternative 3: To issue COFTRs first, and LOFTRs next. As mentioned earlier, the major portion of the price risk for bilateral contracts is generated by the congestion components of LMP differentials. Therefore, it seems that the utility of an LOFTR will be more if the market player also has a matching COFTR for this LOFTR. Consequently, the third option seems to be the best sequence for releasing COFTRs and LOFTRs. The result of the COFTR auction should be published before the LOFTR auction begins. Also, it seems justified to limit the issuance an LOFTR up to the COFTR quantity that the corresponding market player has already received.
Conducting separate auctions for COFTRs and LOFTRs creates an additional load on a market player to split his total fund for buying hedge against price volatility into a loss fund and a congestion fund. The problem may be solved by issuing totalhedge FTRs (THFTRs). A total-hedge FTR is similar to the combination of a COFTR and an LOFTR, but is settled directly according to the LMP differential on its path. For instance, a 20 MW THFTR is equivalent to the combination of an LOFTR and a COFTR of 20 MW each. Therefore, both the simultaneous feasibility and offset capacity constraints are to be considered in the THFTR auction. The price charged to a total hedge FTR needs to be decomposed into a loss component and a congestion component. The loss component corresponds to offset capacity constraint and the congestion component corresponds to the simultaneous feasibility constraints. The LOARRs are to be settled according to the loss components of LMP differentials and the COARRs are to be settled according to the congestion components of LMP differentials. The network capacity that remains unawarded in the THFTR auction owing to the OCC can be subsequently issued by means of a separate COFTR auction.
VI. NEED FOR LOCATIONAL LOFTRS
It is likely that the issuance of LOFTRs will not be in sufficient amount to closely match the respective COFTRs. This is owing to the lower capacity of the offset capacity constraint. A higher amount of hedge against the network loss can be provided to the forward contracts by the inclusion of locational LOFTRs. The hourly value of a locational LOFTR is calculated according to the energy plus loss component of the LMP at the corresponding location. The value of a locational LOFTR is also independent of the energy reference of the dispatch problem. Each locational LOFTR should be an obligation. Although (unlike the locational FTR of [9] ) the full LMP is not used to calculate the value of a locational LOFTR, it is likely that locational LOFTRs will also be quite attractive to the market players. This is because a major portion of an LMP is usually covered by its energy and loss components.
With the addition of locational LOFTRs, the modified OCT can be stated as follows: If the network loss induced minus the network loss contributed by the physical equivalents of active LOFTRs is less than or equal to when is negative and greater than or equal to when is positive, the net loss collection (day-ahead) at the corresponding hour would usually be at least equal to the total LOFTR target payment at this hour. Mathematically, is said to pass the OCT if
To prove the modified OCT theorem, the vector should be first decomposed into two components, namely, and , i.e.,
The vector contains the nodal injections caused by the physical equivalents of the active point-to-point LOFTRs, whereas vector contains the nodal injections caused by the physical equivalents of the locational LOFTRs. The total target payment towards loss-only FTRs can be now calculated as (41) The modified OCT theorem can be then proven following the same procedure as made previously in Section III-A. It can be further shown that the modified OCT also exhibits reference independency. However, note that the value of is not necessarily zero in the presence of locational LOFTRs. The offset capacity constraint considering locational LOFTRs can be formulated in the same way as it has been carried out only with regular LOFTRs. The value of for a locational LOFTR at Node is given by if it is of injection-type, and by if it is of withdrawal-type. The kind of locational LOFTRs that is mainly required to issue a higher volume of regular LOFTRs is the injection-type LOFTR. To understand this, make a usual (i.e., each element is nonnegative) choice of the slack weight vector for calculating the loss parameters. For such a choice of , the magnitude of each loss factor is always far less than one. Now, from the expression of for an injection-type LOFTR, it can be easily verified that the loading factor of the LOFTR in the offset capacity constraint must be close to minus one. Therefore, by issuing injection-type LOFTRs, the load on the OCC can be effectively released; consequently, more PtP LOFTRs can be issued. However, due to the very high unloading effects of injection-type LOFTRs, if a large volume of such LOFTRs is issued, there will finally remain a spare capacity in the offset capacity constraint and its shadow price will become zero. As a result, the price (to be paid to the ISO) of each LOFTR will also become zero. Clearly, this is not a feasible solution as the player requesting for an injection-type LOFTR usually bids a negative price for this LOFTR. Consequently, a major portion of the injection-type LOFTR requests will, in reality, remain unawarded rendering these LOFTRs very little attractive to the market players. It is therefore necessary to partially neutralize the excessive unloading caused by the injection-type LOFTRs. This can be done by means of withdrawal-type LOFTRs. It is obvious from the expression of the for a withdrawal-type LOFTR that its loading factor must be close to plus one. However, some efficient policy is side-by-side necessary to ensure that the withdrawal-type LOFTRs will not overbalance the OCC unloading caused by the injection-type LOFTRs. It is possible to obtain a proper balance between the issuances of regular and locational LOFTRs by the incorporation of both injection-type and withdrawal-type LOFTRs. However, it is important to note that the issuance of locational type transmission rights is not essential for the LOFTR methodology, which is another major difference between the LOFTR concept and [9] .
VII. CASE STUDY
A case study is performed on the modified IEEE 30-bus system. The objective of the case study is threefold: LOFTRs on the issuance of regular LOFTRs; 3) to see how a proper balance can be obtained by the incorporation of both injection-type and withdrawal-type locational LOFTRs. In the modified 30-bus system, the resistance of each line is taken as one-fifth of its reactance. The line reactances are kept at their original values and the capacity of each line is taken as 100 MW. The base MVA is 100. Table II presents the details of COFTRs that are requested in a certain COFTR auction. The acronyms "Ob" and "Op" stand for obligation and option, respectively. For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that no base case FTRs are there. The result of the COFTR auction is shown in Table III .
The LOFTR auction is conducted after the COFTR auction is over. Before conducting the LOFTR auction, it is required to calculate the loss factors and the loss offset. Unlike the calculation of the branch-node sensitivity matrix, we need to first establish a base case power flow for calculating the loss parameters. Ideally, the base case should be the same as that used in the day-ahead dispatch problem. There may be a practice in which the same loss factors and loss offset are used over a long time period to perform the dispatch calculation [18] . For such a case, the LOFTRs can be revenue-adequately issued in sufficiently time-ahead by simply making utilization of the already calculated loss parameters. Even if the loss parameters are frequently updated, a suitable base case for calculating the loss parameters in the LOFTR auction can be prepared by scheduling on the network the physical equivalents of the FTRs issued in the COFTR auction. This is because 1) in most of the cases, a COFTR, in effect, indicates a bilateral transaction that is going to be executed in future; 2) the volume of power that is transacted without the FTR hedge is small; 3) the major portion of power is usually traded through bilateral agreements. Although there is a possibility of the occurrence of revenue shortfall due to the loss parameter mismatch, its severity is likely to be minor. The severity of the revenue shortfall problem may be further reduced by leaving some margin in the estimated loss offset. It is also possible to enhance the accuracy by making some adjustments to the above base case depending upon the practical system study, which may be a matter of further research. Similarly to the COFTRs, the LOFTRs also should be time-differentiated. The time-differentiation [6] of LOFTRs further assists in accounting the loss factor (and loss offset) variation from one time interval to another time interval (say from on-peak hours to off-peak hours). It is important to note that the issuance of COFTRs is also not totally free from the revenue shortfall problem [6] .
However, the LOFTR requests that are received from the market players in our auction are listed in Table IV. In the LOFTR auction, a player is not permitted to request an FTR amount that is higher than what he has received from the COFTR auction. The nodal loss coefficient factors of the system are shown in Table V . The loss factors are calculated with reference to the Node 1. The base case is prepared by using the COFTRs in Table III . The value of (in MW) is calculated as . Note that none of the market players submits any option request in the LOFTR auction although they do it in the COFTR auction. In fact, there is no practical use of isolated option LOFTRs as the sign of the loss component of an LMP differential almost remains fixed. For a choice of all nonnegative slack weights in the OCT, the sign of the loss component of the LMP differential usually remains the same as that of the loss factor associated with the corresponding path. Option LOFTRs can come into picture only in a hidden way through option THFTRs.
The result of the LOFTR auction is shown in Table VI . The solution is not unsatisfactory because three out of five requests become fully awarded. Now, consider that the injection-type LOFTRs can also be requested in the market. Table VII presents a list of five injection-type LOFTR requests that are to be additionally considered in the auction. The result of the new LOFTR auction is shown in Table VIII .
Clearly, the volume issued towards each regular LOFTR request becomes higher. In fact, all of these requests get fully TABLE V  LOSS FACTORS   TABLE VI  RESULT OF THE LOFTR AUCTION 1   TABLE VII  LIST OF REQUESTED INJECTION-TYPE LOFTRS   TABLE VIII  RESULT OF THE LOFTR AUCTION 2 awarded. However, a significant portion of the injection-type LOFTR requests remains unawarded. As mentioned earlier, this may make injection-type LOFTRs very little attractive to the market players and consequently no such locational LOFTR request may come to the auction. To be able to issue a good amount of injection-type LOFTRs, withdrawal-type LOFTRs are also needed to be invited from the market players. Table IX shows the withdrawal-type LOFTR requests that are received from the market players. The result of the auction after the inclusion of both types of locational LOFTRs is shown in Table X . Now, observe that the all the LOFTR requests excepting the third injection-type LOFTR request become fully awarded. Even, the third injection-type LOFTR request TABLE IX  LIST OF REQUESTED WITHDRAWAL-TYPE LOFTRS   TABLE X  RESULT OF THE LOFTR AUCTION 3 gets awarded in more than 60%. As a result, the new solution exhibits a good balance.
VIII. CONCLUSION
An FTR instrument is designed in this paper to guard the forward contracts from the volatility of the loss components of LMP differentials. With the inclusion of this FTR instrument, two parallel FTR systems exist in the market. One of the FTR systems is called as the loss-only FTR system and another is called as the congestion-only FTR system. The COFTRs are the same as the traditional FTRs, whereas the LOFTRs are used to provide hedge against the network loss. A mechanism called as the offset capacity test is developed for the revenue adequate issuance of LOFTRs. The basis of the OCT is the common observation that the energy component of the LMP usually bears the opposite sign as that of the loss offset. The LOFTR auction process is discussed and tested for the nonnegativity of the net auction collection. The ARR mechanism for this new FTR universe is explained. Similarly to FTRs, an ARR can be either a COARR or an LOARR. The COARRs are settled according to the price outcomes of the COFTR auction, whereas the LOARRs are settled according to the price outcomes of the LOFTR auction. Owing to the fact that the price risk for the forward contracts is mainly generated by the network congestion, the COFTRs should be issued before the issuance of LOFTRs. This helps a market participant to suitably plan his LOFTR request. The overburden on a market player to separately decide the bid prices for his COFTR and LOFTR requests can be relieved by means of total-hedge FTRs. Owing to the scarcity of the offset capacity, it is likely that there will not be a matching (or closely matching) LOFTR for each COFTR. A policy, called as the locational LOFTR, is suggested to overcome this problem. The effectiveness of the loss-hedging framework developed is illustrated through a case study.
